Abstract. We propose an operational framework for a social, technical and contextual analysis of security. The framework provides guidelines about how to model a system as a layered set of interacting elements, and proposes two methodologies to analyse technical and social vulnerabilities. We show how to apply the framework in a use case scenario.
Introduction
Systems that are secure even when used by humans -a property that we call effective security-are hard to make. A system can embed technical mechanisms that make it technically secure, such as encryption protocols, but those mechanisms can fail if users bypass or misuse them. Such failures are common since humans do not perceive security as a primary goal [1] and do not properly assess risks when using information communication technology [2, 3] . There is more: computer system designers, with a few exceptions [4] , are not accustomed to count human cognitive and behavioural traits as risk factors in the security requirements. Thus, even systems that have been validated as technically secure, may still be insecure against non-technical attacks (e.g., social engineering) remaining oblivious of socio-technical vulnerabilities.
How can we achieve a better effective security? There is no once-and-forall solution. Effective security is a complex quality to achieve. It is inherently socio-technical (it depends on how human and technical aspects integrate) and it may be context and culture (incl. education) dependent [5, 6] . For example, in hospitals, access control solutions cannot be effective unless designed to fit the nomadic, interrupted, and cooperative nature of the medical work [7] . But, the same access control solutions would be judged differently in a context such as a bank, where employees work mostly alone and where security requirements must consider, for example, threats coming from hackers (e.g., see [8] ).
To make a system effectively secure in different scenarios, it likely requires diverse strategies and solutions. However, it is possible to refer to a common framework of analysis. Such a framework should help computer security designers and social scientists to collaborate by providing an operational guideline for an interdisciplinary approach in studying a system's security, as well as tools and methodologies for questioning security at both the technical and the social layers.
Contribution. This paper proposes and describes such framework. STEAL (Socio-TEchnical Attack AnaLysis) appears from the need to have a common systematic framework matured from previous experiences the authors had in modelling and analysing socio-technical security [9, 10] .
Related Work
Zhu et al. [11] study how an attacker manages to influence the human to take the wrong decision and acquire his private information. They simulate a scenario where an attacker plays successfully the norm of reciprocity (mutual messages exchange with the user) with the victims who are shopping online with mobile devices. However, this study is incipient and does not provide a systematic way to test and mitigate this or other similar norms. STEAL could model the norm of reciprocity scenario with an overview of all the interactions and maybe provide defences that could be applied in different parts of the system, and not only within the human-computer interface dialogue.
Cranor et al. [12, 13] propose a framework to understand how security failures happen when users misbehave because of flawed human-computer communications. This framework is a sequence of generic steps the designer follows to identify potential failure points for each technical function of the system, where the user participates. The designer needs to mitigate those failures, either by eliminating user's intervention altogether if possible, or improving user's interaction. However, there is no specific model/methodology to reproduce both the sequential or the mitigation process and to enable/operationalize scientific-experimental research. Moreover, Cranor's research assumes to know exactly how a technical function will be used by a human and tries to improve it before its usage. So humans are bound by the technology and how a function can be performed, but this may not always be true. The next two works also assume this. Conti et al. [14] research on visualization systems that typically include the human in the decision-making loop and present a visual taxonomy to identify attacks. Falk et al. [15] examine the prevalence of user-visible security design flaws in high security requirements' financial websites, and present a methodology to testing these issues: selecting the most common five security user-visible flaws of website design and identify them in a set of websites. All the above works study the interactions between the user and the computer interface, mostly clarifying usability questions, and not so much enquire about security in all systems' functions and interactions.
Our framework, instead, provides for the design and analysis of socio-technical attacks to the system's functions, humans, context and all its interactions. An attack may exploit bad communications' design but may also ignore technical functions altogether and focus on the context or the human to perform a successful attack. Moreover, although much research on security usability has been done, these studies are also mostly technology driven.
